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Paying for Default: Change over Time in the Share of Federal Financial 
Aid Sent to Institutions with High Student Loan Default Rates 
By Ozan Jaquette and Nicholas W. Hillman 
Both federal spending on financial aid and student loan default rates have increased over the past 
decade. These trends have intensified policymakers’ concerns that some postsecondary institutions—
particularly in the for-profit sector—maximize revenue derived from federal financial aid without 
helping students to graduate or find employment. Prior studies have analyzed federal financial aid 
disbursements and student loan default rates in isolation from one another. Therefore, little is 
known about how much federal aid flows through colleges with high student loan default rates. The 
present study examines change over time and across sectors in the share of federal financial aid dis-
bursed to institutions with “low,” “medium,” and “high” student loan default rates. We found that 
the share of federal student aid flowing through colleges with medium and high student loan default 
rates increased substantially from 2007-08 to 2012-13, but declined in 2013-14 as the national job 
market improved. However, the reduction in federal financial aid disbursed to for-profit 
institutions with high student loan default rates occurred prior to the national job-market recovery, 
suggesting that federal regulations helped to divert federal financial aid from poor-performing 
institutions. 
Keywords: Student loan default, federal financial aid, proprietary institutions, federal policy 
 
ver the past decade, the total volume of outstanding student loan debt has tripled and is now over 
$1 trillion (Federal Reserve Bank of NY, 2014). Federal expenditure on financial aid has also in-
creased dramatically, particularly expenditure on the Federal Pell Grant program, which has dou-
bled since the Great Recession (Congressional Budget Office, 2013). At the same time, student loan default 
rates have been on the rise. Today, approximately one in seven borrowers (13.7%) defaults within three 
years of entering repayment (Federal Student Aid, 2013b). Federal policymakers are concerned about these 
trends because financial aid programs are costly to the federal government and because debt and default 
have long-term negative consequences for students. They are also concerned that some colleges, particularly 
in the for-profit sector, maximize the revenue derived from federal aid programs without helping students 
graduate or find employment (U.S. Department of Education, 2010). 
As colleges increasingly rely on students and their associated financial aid dollars as a source of revenue, 
it becomes more important to document how federal aid flows through various sectors of higher education 
(Hossler, 2006; Sridharam, 2012). One way the federal government monitors and regulates this flow of 
funds is through the Cohort Default Rate (CDR) policy. CDR policy rewards and penalizes colleges accord-
ing to the percentage of borrowers who default. If rates are too high, colleges can lose access to all federal 
financial aid, which consequently affects their revenue streams. The purpose of this study is to examine how 
much federal aid flows through colleges with different levels of CDRs. 
Ozan Jaquette is assistant professor in the Department of Educational Policy Studies and Practice, University of Arizona. Nicholas W. 
Hillman is assistant professor in the Department of Educational Leadership and Policy Analysis, University of Wisconsin - Madison. 
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This study is important because CDR policy is one of the few regulatory tools the federal government 
has to ensure that colleges are accountable for the aid they disburse. Therefore, the analyses presented here 
provide an assessment of how well this accountability system is working, and these analyses may even in-
form debates about how CDR policy could be revised in the future. This study is also important because 
default is costly to students. Borrowers cannot discharge their federal student loans in bankruptcy and there 
is no statute of limitations on collecting them. When borrowers default, they face a wide range of additional 
penalties, including lower credit scores, garnishing of wages and tax refunds, and the payment of collection 
agency fees (Cunningham & Kienzl, 2011; Loonin, 2006). Because defaulting on federal student loans has 
such high costs for students, it is important to examine the extent to which institutions with high rates of 
student loan default are receiving a large share of federal financial aid disbursements. 
Despite the recent increase in CDRs, particularly in the for-profit sector (Sridharam, 2012), little is 
known about how much federal aid flows through colleges with high student loan default rates because pri-
or studies have analyzed federal financial aid disbursements and CDRs in isolation from one another. There-
fore, the present study offers a new perspective on how well the federal financial aid system is working by 
asking: To what extent is federal student aid disbursed among colleges with “low,” “medium” and “high” 
CDRs? Furthermore, has this changed over time and how do these trends differ across sectors? 
Policy Background and Conceptual Framework 
Title IV of the 1965 Higher Education Act created the modern federal financial aid system (Heller, 2011). 
Therefore, federal financial aid is often called Title IV financial aid and institutions eligible to enroll students 
receiving Title IV financial aid are Title IV institutions. Aside from research funding, Title IV financial aid is 
the primary source of federal funding for higher education, with total annual expenditures (excluding tax 
benefits) increasing from $76 billion in 2002-03 to $158 billion in 2011-12 (2012 CPI; College Board, 2013). 
Title IV financial aid also represents the primary policy lever by which the federal government compels Title 
IV institutions to focus on federal policy goals. 
Principal Agent Theory and Federal Financial Aid 
The federal financial aid system can be usefully analyzed through the lens of principal agent theory (PAT). 
According to PAT, a goal-oriented principal enters into contractual agreements with agents charged with 
delivering these goals (Hansmann, 1996; Lane & Kivisto, 2008). However, self-interest may drive an agent’s 
goals, which as a result can run contrary to those of the principal. To mitigate this risk, principals may en-
gage in several strategies to reduce agent behaviors that run contrary to the goals of the principal. For exam-
ple, principals develop rules designed to control an agent’s behavior, and then the two parties negotiate 
contracts specifying these rules. After an agent signs the contract, principals monitor agent behavior to en-
sure the agent does not shirk on its responsibility. Monitoring can be costly and regulations are often diffi-
cult to enforce, so there are significant transaction costs embedded within principal-agent agreements 
(Waterman & Meier, 1998). Therefore, principals often develop “incentive-based contracts” where payment 
depends on performance, thereby creating incentives for agents to pursue goals valued by the principal.  
PAT is useful for developing insights about federal financial aid policy because the relationship between 
the federal government and postsecondary institutions is a principal-agent relationship. The federal govern-
ment is the principal that pursues policy goals related to student outcomes (e.g., college access, degree com-
pletion, gainful employment) and enters into contractual agreements with postsecondary institutions (agents) 
to achieve these goals. Specifically, the program participation agreement (PPA) is a contract created by the 
federal government that specifies the regulatory requirements for gaining and maintaining Title IV eligibility 
(Congressional Research Service, 2007). After signing the PPA, a postsecondary institution becomes a Title 
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IV institution that is eligible to enroll students receiving Title IV financial aid. This arrangement creates a 
national voucher system in that non-campus based federal financial aid flows to whatever Title IV institu-
tion students choose to attend (Alexander, 1998; Kane, 1996). Institutions receive a portion of federal finan-
cial aid disbursed to students to pay for tuition, fees, etc., representing a significant revenue source for many 
Title IV institutions.  
 
Policy Debates about Title IV Eligibility 
 
There is considerable debate about the extent to which the federal government should hold Title IV in-
stitutions accountable for the outcomes of students they enroll. On one side of the debate, proponents of 
strong federal policy and performance accountability are concerned that some Title IV institutions may fo-
cus on maximizing revenue from Title IV financial aid instead of focusing on student outcomes valued by 
the federal government, such as degree completion and gainful employment. For example, Senator Harkin’s 
investigation of for-profit schools (Lewin, 2012) and the Department of Education’s gainful employment 
rulemaking have become focal points of reform efforts (U.S. Department of Education, 2010, 2014). Given 
these concerns, PAT suggests that the federal government should create incentives for Title IV institutions 
to focus on student outcomes by developing regulations that hold institutions accountable for meeting cer-
tain standards on student outcomes. 
 
Critics of policies that tie institutional Title IV eligibility to student outcomes argue that differences in 
student outcomes across institutions are primarily due to differences in student inputs rather than differ-
ences in institutional behavior (e.g., Guryan & Thompson, 2014; Shapiro & Pham, 2010). For example, 
Princeton University students would likely have strong employment outcomes regardless of the quality of 
education provided simply because Princeton selects students who are likely to succeed in the labor market. 
By contrast, an open-admissions college that provides all students with a high-quality education could have 
weak employment outcomes because of the characteristics of the students they serve. In addition, critics ar-
gue student employment outcomes are sensitive to economic trends that are beyond the control of institu-
tions (Guryan & Thompson, 2014). For example, during the Great Recession the national unemployment 
rate increased from 4.7% in Nov. 2007 to 10% in Oct. 2009, and remained above 8% until Sept. 2012, mak-
ing it difficult for degree completers to find jobs. Also, critics argue that holding institutions accountable for 
student outcomes (without adjusting for students inputs) creates an incentive for institutions to decrease 
access for underprepared students (Cunha & Miller, 2014). 
 
Regardless of which side of the debate one is on, CDR policy is currently the only Title IV regulation 
that conditions institutional Title IV eligibility on student outcomes (Federal Student Aid, 2013a). CDRs 
measure the proportion of an institution’s borrowers who default on federal student loans within a specified 
period. In 1990, Congress passed legislation whereby institutions lost Title IV eligibility if two-year CDRs—
which defined default as defaulting within two fiscal years of entering repayment—exceeded 40% for one 
year or exceeded 25% for three consecutive years (Two Year Cohort Default Rates, 2013). Federal policy 
recently transitioned to three-year CDRs, whereby institutions lose Title IV eligibility if three-year CDRs 
exceed 40% for one year or exceed 30% for three consecutive years; alternatively, colleges with three-year 
CDRs below 15% are given greater flexibility for disbursing aid (Cohort Default Rates, 2013). 
 
In addition to these changes to CDR policy, the Obama Administration initiated other important chang-
es to federal financial aid. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 dramatically increased Pell 
Grant funding and represented a policy shift from an emphasis on loans to an emphasis on grants. Addi-
tionally, starting on July 1, 2010, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act eliminated the federally 
guaranteed Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP), with all new loans being made through the 
Direct Loan program. However, as political debate about the federal deficit intensified, Congress eliminated 
the year-round Pell Grant, effective July 1, 2011, (New America Foundation, 2014). Further, effective July 1, 
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2012, the Budget Control Act of 2011 made students without a high school diploma or a GED ineligible for 
Pell Grants, reduced the number of semesters a full-time student is allowed to receive Pell from 18 to 12, 
and eliminated subsidized federal student loans for graduate students. 
 
The Obama Administration has been unsuccessful in passing major regulations that more closely tie Title 
IV funding to institutional performance on student outcomes. First, the proposed “gainful employment 
rule” would condition the Title IV eligibility of career and vocational programs on the employment out-
comes of program graduates (e.g., “debt to earnings ratios”). However, lawsuits from the for-profit sector 
have blocked its implementation and future prospects for the rule remain unclear (Fain, 2013; Field, 2014b). 
Second, the Obama Administration proposed the creation of a postsecondary institution rating system 
(PIRS) that eventually would be tied to Title IV funding (The White House, 2013). In recognition that dif-
ferences in student inputs affect institution-level student outcomes, the system would rate institutions on 
student outcomes after controlling for differences in student inputs. However, future prospects for the rat-
ing system also remain unclear (Field, 2014c). 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
Literature on Student Loan Default 
 
Because this paper focuses on the intersection between student loan default and the allocation of Title IV 
financial aid to institutions, we review research on student loan default and on federal student aid. Student 
loan default became a policy concern in the 1980s (Sommer, 1995), leading to the collection of data on 
CDRs and the emergence of empirical literature on the determinants of default. CDRs declined throughout 
the 1990s but began to increase again in the 2000s, leading to a resurgence in empirical research on default. 
 
Early studies tended to focus on student characteristics associated with default. Studies found that default 
rates were relatively higher for African American students (e.g., Greene, 1989; Woo, 2002), for students with 
dependent children (e.g., Volkwein & Szelest, 1995), for students from households with low income or low 
parental education (e.g., Knapp & Seaks, 1992; Volkwein & Cabrera, 1998), for students with low levels of 
pre-collegiate academic achievement (e.g., Dynarski, 1994), and for students who did not complete their 
postsecondary program of study or who were unemployed (e.g., Hillman, 2014b). Summarizing this empiri-
cal literature, Monteverde (2000, p. 337) stated that: 
 
[T]he determinants of student loan default are primarily borrower-based rather than linked, 
in any causal manner, to the borrowers’ school-of-attendance. Where there is a relationship 
detected between a category of school and high default rates, it is not because “offending” 
schools are causing defaults. High default schools are those who attract students with a high 
likelihood to default. Default proclivity is a pre-existing condition. 
 
However, more recent studies have found a systematic relationship between institutional characteristics 
and the probability of default, even after controlling for student characteristics associated with default 
(Gross, Cekic, Hossler, & Hillman, 2009; Webber & Rogers, 2014). This research suggests that default is not 
simply due to students’ backgrounds or the economic conditions of the day. Rather, the type of college a 
student attends explains substantial variation in default. One consistent finding is that the probability of de-
fault is highest for students attending for-profit colleges (Deming, Goldin, & Katz, 2012; Hillman, 2014b). 
Similarly, Belfield (2013), who analyzed institutional repayment rate (i.e., the proportion of outstanding debt 
paid by the cohort), rather than default rates, found that repayment rates were lowest at for-profit colleges. 
This new line of research suggests “supply-side” factors (e.g., institutional characteristics and behaviors) are 
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often more important predictors of default than “demand-side” factors (e.g., student characteristics and be-
haviors). 
 
Literature on the Supply of Federal Aid 
 
The majority of supply-side studies on federal financial aid analyze the relationship between the availability 
of aid and changes in tuition. These studies are primarily concerned with testing the Bennett Hypothesis, 
which argues that colleges are rent-seekers; they respond to expansions of federal and state financial aid by 
raising tuition price in order to capture the government subsidy (Bennett, 1987). Singell and Stone (2007) 
found that private nonprofit institutions raised tuition price nearly one dollar for each dollar increase in Pell 
Grant per recipient. Public universities did not raise in-state tuition in response to increases in Pell Grant 
awards but did increase out-of-state tuition price. Similarly, Cellini and Goldin (2014) found that for-profit 
colleges eligible for federal financial aid charged higher tuition than for-profit colleges that were ineligible 
for aid, suggesting that the Bennett Hypothesis may be true for the for-profit sector. Additionally, the sup-
ply of federal aid may not only affect tuition price, but also institutional financial aid offers. Turner (2014) 
found that increases in Pell Grants induce colleges to spend less on institutional aid, with the greatest reduc-
tions occurring in private nonprofit colleges.  
 
A second supply-side literature offers a descriptive overview of changes in federal financial aid over time. 
The College Board’s annual Trends in Student Aid report shows the long-term trends in federal financial aid 
expenditure, and it also shows how federal aid is disbursed across various sectors over time. For example, in 
the 2012-13 academic year, public two-year institutions enrolled 30% of total FTE undergraduate students 
and disbursed 33% of all Pell Grant aid, 15% of all Direct Subsidized Loans, and 7% of all Direct Unsubsi-
dized Loans (College Board, 2013). Public four-year institutions enrolled 41% of all FTE undergraduate stu-
dents and disbursed 32% of all Pell Grant aid, 41% of all Direct Subsidized Loan aid, and 39% of all Direct 
Unsubsidized Loan aid. For-profit institutions enrolled 12% of all FTE undergraduate students and dis-
bursed 21% of all Pell Grant aid, 21% of all Direct Subsidized Loan Aid, and 21% of all Direct Unsubsi-
dized Loan Aid.  
 
Our review of research on student loan default and supply-side studies of federal financial aid reveals that 
few studies have analyzed the intersection between these two literatures. Despite growth over the past dec-
ade in student loan default rates and the amount of Title IV aid flowing to institutions, scholars have not 
examined change over time in the amount of Title IV grants and loans flowing to institutions with high rates 
of student loan default. The present study addresses this research gap by conducting analyses that integrate 
institution-level data on Title IV aid disbursement with institution-level data on CDRs. 
 
 
Data, Variables, and Methods 
 
Data and Sample 
 
Data. We created a panel analysis dataset that merged institution-level data from three sources: (1) the Inte-
grated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS); (2) data from the Office of Federal Student Aid 
(FSA) on Title IV financial aid disbursements; and (3) FSA data on three-year CDRs. All financial data was 
inflation-adjusted to 2012 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. 
 
Analysis sample. The analysis sample was the universe of Title IV institutions. A Title IV institution may 
be a single-campus institution or a multi-campus institution with a main campus and one or more branch 
campuses. The analysis dataset consisted of one observation per academic year for each Title IV institution, 
regardless of whether the Title IV institution was a stand-alone campus or a multi-campus institution. As an 
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example, Rutgers University is a multi-campus Title IV institution, with the main campus at New Brunswick 
and branch campuses at Camden and Newark. The analysis dataset contained one observation per academic 
year for Rutgers University and each of these observations contained data from all three Rutgers campuses. 
 
Analysis period. The analysis period was 2007-08 to 2013-14 due to the availability of three-year CDR data. 
When possible, we utilized a longer analysis period for descriptive statistics that did not require three-year 
CDR data.  
 
Variables 
 
IPEDS variables. The IPEDS variable “sector” is collected through the Institutional Characteristics survey 
component; this is a nine-category variable that combines ownership control (public, private nonprofit, and 
for-profit) and highest degree awarded (baccalaureate or above, associate’s degree, and less-than-associate’s 
degree.). The “FTE enrollment” variable is based on total instructional activity from the 12-Month Enroll-
ment component of IPEDS. Academic programs typically measure instructional activity in credit hours, 
while vocational programs often measure instructional activity in contact hours. We converted credit hours 
and contact hours to FTE enrollments using the standard formula described by the National Center for Ed-
ucation Statistics (2013). This conversion enabled us to compare different institutions on the basis of total 
instructional activity, measured in terms of FTE enrollment. 
 
Title IV financial aid disbursement variables. We created two measures of Title IV disbursements. First, the 
measure of total Title IV grants disbursed represented the annual sum of Title IV financial aid disbursed 
from the following grant programs: Pell, TEACH, National Smart, Academic Competitiveness, and the 
Iraq/Afghanistan Service (for children of deceased veterans). This measure excludes Reserve Officers’ 
Training Corps (ROTC) and Montgomery GI Bill scholarships. 
 
Second, the measure of total Title IV loans represented the annual sum of loans disbursed under the 
Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program, discontinued in 2010-11, and the Direct Loan (DL) pro-
gram. The specific loan types included within both the FFEL and DL programs were subsidized, unsubsi-
dized, Parent PLUS, and Grad PLUS. Note that we measured loans disbursed rather than loans awarded 
(students may elect a disbursement amount lower than the award amount).  
 
Campus-based programs, specifically Federal Perkins Loan, Federal Work Study, and Federal Supple-
mental Educational Opportunity Grant, were not included in the measures of Title IV grants and loans be-
cause data on campus-based programs were not publicly available for all years of the analysis period. 
However, campus-based programs represent a small proportion of Title IV financial aid disbursements. For 
example, in 2011-12, the sum of all campus-based disbursements was $3.0 billion and the sum of total Title 
IV loans was $104.4 billion (authors’ calculation, 2012 CPI). 
 
Cohort Default Rate (CDR) variables. The federal government recently transitioned from two-year CDRs to 
three-year CDRs (Federal Student Aid, 2014b). We created measures of both two-year and three-year CDRs, 
but only report results for three-year CDRs here. Results for two-year CDRs are available upon request.  
 
CDRs are calculated as the number of borrowers who entered repayment and defaulted (numerator) di-
vided by a measure of the number of borrowers who entered repayment (denominator) during a given fiscal 
year. For example, the 2010 federal fiscal year ran from Oct. 1, 2009, to Sept. 30, 2010, so the denominator 
for 2010 three-year CDRs was the number of borrowers who entered repayment at some point from Oct. 1, 
2009, to Sept. 30, 2010. The numerator for 2010 three-year CDRs was the number of borrowers who en-
tered repayment during the Oct. 1, 2009, to Sept. 30, 2010, period and who defaulted at some point during 
the Oct. 1, 2009, to Sept. 30, 2012 period.  
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Additional CDR policy details describe which loans are included in CDR calculations, the definition of 
default, and the CDR formula for institutions with less than 30 borrowers entering repayment (Federal 
Student Aid, 2014b). The CDR calculation includes Subsidized and Unsubsidized Stafford Loans disbursed 
under the FFEL program and DL program and excludes loans from the following programs: Parent PLUS 
(DL and FFEL), Grad PLUS (DL and FFEL), Federal Insured Student Loans, and Federal Perkins Loans. If 
a Title IV institution has fewer than 30 borrowers entering repayment during a fiscal year, the official CDR 
reflects the average of the CDRs from the prior three fiscal years. 
 
We established cut-points for low, medium, and high three-year CDRs based on CDR policy rules 
(Federal Student Aid, 2014b). We defined low CDRs as below 15% because institutions with CDRs below 
15% benefit from more favorable loan terms. For example, if a Title IV institution’s three most recent 
three-year CDRs are below 15%, it may disburse loans for an entire semester/trimester/quarter in a single 
installment and is exempt from the 30-day delayed disbursement rule for first-time borrowers. We defined 
CDRs between 15% and 30% as medium CDRs, and CDRs greater than 30% as high CDRs because institu-
tions with three-year CDRs in excess of 30% for three consecutive years lose their Title IV eligibility. 
 
Types of Methods 
 
Since the purpose of the paper is to examine descriptive trends, rather than make causal statements, we 
conducted descriptive analyses rather than regression analyses. Because the analysis sample consisted of the 
population of Title IV institutions, rather than a sample of Title IV institutions, we conducted non-
inferential descriptive analyses rather than inferential descriptive analyses. 
 
 
Limitations 
 
This paper has two important limitations. First, the analyses presented here provide a “forest-level” view of 
changes over time and differences across sector; they do not examine trends for specific institutions. For 
example, while the for-profit, four-year sector consists of institutions that vary dramatically in size and in 
curricular focus, our analyses do not show how trends in Title IV disbursement and CDRs differ across in-
dividual institutions within this sector.  
 
Second, the purpose of the paper is to show descriptive trends rather than the identification of causal 
factors affecting these trends. Our descriptive analyses cannot determine the extent to which changes in the 
economy, changes in federal policy that affected the behavior of Title IV institutions, or changes in the qual-
ity of loan servicing by the federal government drove time trends in CDRs. As an example, starting in 2009 
the U.S. Department of Education transitioned from a single loan servicer that serviced all Direct Loans to 
four loan-servicing organizations. Several high-profile lawsuits have documented inappropriate practices by 
these new loan servicers that may contribute to higher CDRs (NCLC & SLBA, 2014). However, our anal-
yses do not show the extent to which changes in CDRs were due to the behavior of loan servicers. 
 
 
Results 
 
To contextualize our results, we begin by showing trends over time and across sectors in in enrollment, aid 
disbursement, and CDRs. These trends provide helpful context for our key research question: How does the 
amount of federal financial aid disbursed at Title IV institutions with low, medium, and high CDRs change 
over time and differ across sectors?  
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Trends in FTE Enrollment by Sector 
 
Table 1 shows change over time in total FTE enrollment by sector at Title IV-eligible institutions. Total 
FTE enrollment increased from about 12.1 million in 1999-00 to about 14.6 million in 2006-7. Consistent 
with research on college enrollment and labor market conditions (e.g., Dellas & Sakellaris, 2003; Hillman & 
Orians, 2013), total enrollment increased to 18.4 million in 2010-11 following the Great Recession, but de-
clined to 17.0 million in 2012-13 as economic conditions improved. Total enrollment at for-profit institu-
tions increased dramatically from 835,000 in 1999-00 (6.9% of total FTE enrollment) to 2.7 million in 2010-
11 (14.7% of total FTE enrollment), but declined to 2.2 million by 2012-13 (12.9% of total FTE enroll-
ment).  
 
 
Table 1. Total FTE Enrollment, Based on 12-Month Instructional Activity, by Sector for Title IV-
Eligible Institutions 
 
  Four-year institutions Two-year institutions 
Less than two-year  
institutions 
Public 
Non-
profit 
For-
profit Public 
Non-
profit 
For-
profit Public 
Non-
profit 
For-
profit Total 
1999-00 5,003,217 2,415,941 234,635 3,702,385 78,021 362,033 39,305 7,192 238,061 12,080,790
2000-01 5,017,126 2,489,191 369,283 3,646,773 67,042 394,713 38,841 15,573 186,781 12,225,323
2001-02 5,337,238 2,733,086 366,369 3,916,501 61,270 407,835 58,928 15,165 324,419 13,220,811
2002-03 5,491,396 2,806,485 417,650 4,157,748 68,650 478,723 58,246 24,968 448,080 13,951,946
2003-04 5,652,590 2,898,245 532,823 4,072,880 56,166 498,287 52,815 23,727 368,743 14,156,276
2004-05 5,705,099 2,920,710 651,099 4,103,163 56,673 552,673 53,759 19,674 500,322 14,563,172
2005-06 5,801,537 2,951,509 728,394 4,035,516 55,564 455,178 39,862 17,309 308,929 14,393,798
2006-07 5,941,135 2,986,095 802,534 4,075,830 49,637 433,207 47,552 16,792 300,172 14,652,954
2007-08 6,139,596 3,108,191 963,121 4,266,232 42,263 472,678 69,062 17,569 419,368 15,498,080
2008-09 6,339,884 3,245,005 1,237,465 4,535,967 46,480 467,303 61,082 16,903 360,267 16,310,356
2009-10 6,762,250 3,482,352 1,519,317 4,942,046 49,736 615,034 61,578 18,175 420,032 17,870,520
2010-11 6,967,028 3,590,015 1,623,789 4,980,570 47,752 680,449 59,154 16,119 392,415 18,357,291
2011-12 6,816,176 3,366,303 1,523,202 4,680,342 59,346 561,587 48,461 15,550 383,533 17,454,500
2012-13 6,787,689 3,363,270 1,366,989 4,567,728 54,257 478,244 46,697 12,128 344,456 17,021,458
Number of Title IV Institutions 
  
  
  
  
 
1999-00 575 1,442 123 1,104 253 635 237 59 1,097 5,525
2012-13 618 1,490 240 1,006 153 649 239 56 1,202 5,653
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Trends in Title IV Disbursements 
 
Student loan volume. To conserve space, the remaining tables aggregate two-year and less-than-two year institu-
tions (hereafter two-year-or-less institutions). Table 2 shows Title IV loan disbursement by consolidated sec-
tor. The top panel of Table 2 shows total Title IV loan disbursement ($billions, 2012 CPI) and the bottom 
panel shows median Title IV loans disbursed per FTE student. Trends in total loan disbursement largely 
mirror enrollment trends; total loan disbursement reached a peak of $105.8 billion in 2010-11 when national 
unemployment was high, and then declined to $91.3 billion by 2012-13 as the job-market improved. Look-
ing at specific sectors, total loan disbursement at community colleges increased substantially, from $1.9 bil-
lion in 1999-00 (5% of all loans) to $8.6 billion in 2011-12 (8% of all loans). Total loan disbursements at for-
profits increased dramatically from $4.6 billion in 1999-00 (11% of all loans) to $26.0 billion in 2009-10 
(25% of all loans) but, mirroring the enrollment decline in the for-profit sector, declined to $15.4 billion by 
2012-13 (17% of all loans). 
 
Grant volume. Table 3 shows that total Title IV grant disbursements increased from $9.0 billion in 1999-00 
to $15.4 billion in 2007-08. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 dramatically increased 
total Title IV grant funding—from $19.3 billion in 2008-09 to $31.3 billion in 2009-10 to $36.3 billion in 
2010-11—and increased the median grant amount received per student. However, total grant funding de-
creased to $32.5 billion in 2011-12, following elimination of the year-round Pell Grant, and further de-
creased to $30.4 billion in 2012-13, following restrictions in Pell eligibility mandated by the Budget Control 
Act of 2011. Note that in each year, Pell Grants represent more than 99.5% of federal grant expenditures in 
student aid. 
 
Public universities and community colleges collectively accounted for the majority of federal grant aid 
disbursed (71% of all grant aid in 1999-00 and 67% of all grant aid in 2013-14). Grant disbursements at for-
profits increased sharply from $1.1 billion in 1999-00 (12.4% of all grant aid) to $8.8 billion in 2010-11 
(24.4% of all grant aid), with the majority of this growth occurring in the for-profit four-year sector. How-
ever, grant aid to for-profits declined to $5.7 billion in 2013-14. 
 
Trends in Three-Year Cohort Default Rates (CDRs) 
 
Table 4 shows median three-year CDRs over time by sector.1 It also shows the average national unemploy-
ment rate during the three-year default window associated with each CDR. (See Appendix for additional 
context showing change over time in the number of students entering repayment and the number of stu-
dents who defaulted.) Across all sectors, the median CDR for the 2005 fiscal year (i.e., students who entered 
repayment from Oct. 1, 2004, to Sept. 30, 2005, and had a three-year default window of Oct. 1, 2004, to 
Sept. 30, 2007) was 8.0%. The median CDR for the 2007 fiscal year was 11.2%. One explanation for this 
increase may be that the average unemployment rate was 6.1% during the default window for 2007 fiscal 
year CDRs (Oct. 1, 2006, to Sept. 30, 2009) compared to an unemployment rate of 4.8% during the default 
window for 2005 fiscal year CDRs (Oct. 1, 2004, to Sept. 30, 2007). For 2010 fiscal year CDRs, the median 
CDR was 11.6% and the average unemployment rate was 9.1%. For 2011 fiscal year CDRs, the median 
CDR declined to 9.6% and the average unemployment rate was 8.3% 
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Table 2. Title IV Loan Disbursement by Sector (2012 CPI) 
 
 
 
a Title IV loans disbursed per FTE was defined as total Title IV loans disbursed at the insti-
tution divided by total FTE at the institution. 
b 12-month instructional activity unavailable for 2013-14 academic year at the time of this 
writing.  
  Total Title IV loans disbursed ($billions) 
Four-year institutions Two-year-or-less institutions Total 
Public Nonprofit For-profit Public Nonprofit For-profit   
1999-00 18.6 16.2 2.0 1.9 0.3 2.5 41.5 
2000-01 18.5 16.5 2.5 1.9 0.3 2.7 42.4 
2001-02 19.8 17.4 3.2 2.2 0.3 3.0 45.8 
2002-03 21.9 19.1 4.3 2.7 0.3 3.3 51.6 
2003-04 24.2 20.6 5.5 3.2 0.3 3.8 57.6 
2004-05 25.4 21.6 6.8 3.5 0.3 4.0 61.7 
2005-06 26.1 22.0 7.6 3.6 0.3 3.8 63.4 
2006-07 26.2 23.3 8.5 3.7 0.3 3.8 65.8 
2007-08 27.4 25.0 10.8 4.4 0.3 4.4 72.2 
2008-09 32.7 29.2 15.6 6.0 0.3 6.2 90.0 
2009-10 37.0 32.5 18.8 7.8 0.3 7.1 103.6 
2010-11 38.9 33.7 17.9 8.4 0.3 6.6 105.8 
2011-12 40.0 34.2 15.6 8.6 0.4 5.7 104.4 
2012-13 37.3 30.4 11.5 7.9 0.3 3.9 91.3 
2013-14 37.5 31.9 12.2 7.2 0.2 4.3 93.2 
Median Title IV loans disbursed per FTE ($)a, b 
Four-year institutions Two-year-or-less institutions All 
Public Nonprofit For-profit Public Nonprofit For-profit   
1999-00 3,488 5,292 8,397 634 4,904 4,971 3,985 
2000-01 3,472 5,240 8,819 625 4,270 4,344 3,810 
2001-02 3,550 5,317 8,591 690 3,515 3,817 3,678 
2002-03 3,767 5,617 8,778 764 3,567 3,784 3,832 
2003-04 4,106 6,118 9,987 967 4,156 4,305 4,303 
2004-05 4,264 6,295 10,137 1,085 3,893 4,173 4,346 
2005-06 4,305 6,415 9,409 1,167 4,448 4,185 4,413 
2006-07 4,179 6,334 9,173 1,237 3,879 4,103 4,322 
2007-08 4,205 6,383 9,846 1,224 4,165 4,587 4,523 
2008-09 4,969 7,539 12,233 1,644 5,083 5,700 5,515 
2009-10 5,337 7,971 11,423 1,916 5,320 5,488 5,609 
2010-11 5,408 7,967 9,679 2,061 5,346 5,268 5,495 
2011-12 5,646 8,086 9,308 2,100 5,558 5,341 5,656 
2012-13 5,407 7,474 7,420 2,094 4,764 4,037 4,781 
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Table 3. Title IV Grant Disbursement by Consolidated Sector (2012 CPI) 
Total Title IV grants disbursed ($billions) 
Four-year institutions Two-year or less institutions Total 
Public Nonprofit For-profit Public Nonprofit For-profit 
1999-00 3.6 1.4 0.2 2.9 0.1 0.9 9.0 
2000-01 3.8 1.5 0.3 3.1 0.1 1.0 9.7 
2001-02 4.4 1.8 0.4 4.0 0.1 1.2 12.0 
2002-03 4.9 2.0 0.6 4.7 0.1 1.4 13.7 
2003-04 5.2 2.0 0.7 4.9 0.2 1.6 14.7 
2004-05 5.1 2.0 0.9 4.9 0.1 1.6 14.7 
2005-06 4.8 1.8 1.0 4.4 0.1 1.5 13.7 
2006-07 4.9 1.9 1.1 4.4 0.1 1.4 13.9 
2007-08 5.3 2.1 1.5 4.8 0.1 1.6 15.4 
2008-09 6.2 2.4 2.3 6.2 0.1 2.1 19.3 
2009-10 9.7 3.7 4.3 10.2 0.2 3.3 31.3 
2010-11 11.3 4.2 5.2 11.8 0.2 3.7 36.3 
2011-12 10.4 3.9 4.0 11.2 0.2 2.8 32.5 
2012-13 10.1 3.8 3.6 10.3 0.2 2.5 30.4 
2013-14 10.1 3.9 3.4 9.9 0.1 2.3 29.7 
Median Title IV grants disbursed per FTE ($)a, b 
Four-year institutions Two-year or less institutions All 
Public Nonprofit For-profit Public Nonprofit For-profit 
1999-00 694 672 994 978 1,552 2,216 1,015 
2000-01 755 696 1,094 1,013 1,466 1,805 1,043 
2001-02 867 799 1,111 1,188 1,419 1,869 1,190 
2002-03 910 878 1,281 1,302 1,392 1,915 1,278 
2003-04 934 877 1,529 1,341 1,489 2,073 1,326 
2004-05 905 846 1,660 1,326 1,354 2,014 1,287 
2005-06 837 746 1,510 1,203 1,335 1,859 1,184 
2006-07 842 758 1,586 1,190 1,228 1,807 1,176 
2007-08 913 797 1,707 1,228 1,235 1,944 1,249 
2008-09 1,041 897 1,845 1,458 1,436 2,217 1,455 
2009-10 1,549 1,295 2,836 2,168 1,884 2,918 2,104 
2010-11 1,747 1,447 3,078 2,460 2,242 3,220 2,404 
2011-12 1,628 1,377 2,680 2,419 2,036 2,887 2,242 
2012-13 1,598 1,310 2,589 2,348 2,118 2,817 2,204 
a Title IV grants disbursed per FTE was defined as total Title IV grants disbursed at the in-
stitution divided by total FTE at the institution. 
b 12-month instructional activity unavailable for 2013-14 academic year at the time of this 
writing. 
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Table 4. Median Three-year Cohort Default Rate (CDR) by Sector and Three-year Average  
Unemployment Rate during Default Window 
 
        Median three-year CDRsa by sector 
CDR fiscal year 3-yr average Four-year institutions Two-year-or-less institutions
  
Entered 
repayment 
Default  
window 
Unemploy-
mentb (%) 
All Public 
Non-
profit 
For- 
profit 
Public 
Non-
profit 
For-
profit 
2005 
10/1/04 to 
9/30/05 
10/1/04 to 
9/30/07 
4.8  8.0    4.3    2.9  13.4    12.3    6.2    15.5  
2006 
10/1/05 to 
9/30/06 
10/1/05 to 
9/30/08 
4.9  9.0    4.9    3.0  14.5    13.5    6.9    17.2  
2007 
10/1/06 to 
9/30/07 
10/1/06 to 
9/30/09 
6.1  11.2    6.4    4.4  16.6    15.5    8.8    19.1  
2008 
10/1/07 to 
9/30/08 
10/1/07 to 
9/30/10 
7.8  10.6    6.5    4.8  18.1    14.3    6.7    18.2  
2009 
10/1/08 to 
9/30/09 
10/1/08 to 
9/30/11 
9.1  10.3    7.3    5.4  15.6    15.9    7.3    15.3  
2010 
10/1/09 to 
9/30/10 
10/1/09 to 
9/30/12 
9.1  11.6    8.8    6.2  15.9    17.6    8.3    15.9  
2011 
10/1/10 to 
9/30/11 
10/1/10 to 
9/30/13 
8.3  9.6    8.2    5.2  13.5    15.8    5.9    13.4  
 
a Trial three-year CDRs were calculated for the 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 fiscal years and official three-year CDRs were calculat-
ed for the 2009, 2010, and 2011 fiscal years. 
b Three-year average unemployment percent is the average monthly unemployment rate during the three-year default window, 
based on national monthly unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
 
 
Median CDRs were highest at for-profits and community colleges. However, 75% of for-profit students 
borrow federal loans compared to about 17% of community college students (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2013). CDR trends for community colleges roughly followed economic trends; median CDRs 
reached a peak of 17.6% in the 2010 fiscal year when the average unemployment rate peaked, and declined 
to 15.8% in the 2011 fiscal year when average unemployment rate declined. By contrast, median CDRs at 
for-profits peaked prior to the peak in average unemployment rates, suggesting that CDR declines at for-
profits may be partially due to changes in institutional behavior and/or federal policy. 
 
Integrating Title IV Disbursement and Cohort Default Rate Data 
 
The primary purpose of this paper is to examine how the amount of federal financial aid disbursed at Title 
IV institutions with low, medium, and high CDRs change over time and differ across sectors. These anal-
yses require integrating Title IV disbursement and CDR data.  
 
Because Title IV disbursements are associated with a particular academic year but CDRs are not, we had 
to assign an academic year to each three-year CDR. Several choices exist, each with strengths and draw-
backs. We assigned three-year CDRs to the academic year associated with the end date of the three-year  
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default window. We made this decision because we wanted to link CDRs to the academic year preceding 
Title IV sanctions (for institutions with unacceptably high CDRs) or privileges (for institutions with low 
CDRs). As an example, three-year CDRs for the 2011 fiscal year were associated with a default window of 
Oct. 1, 2010, to Sept. 30, 2013. This end-date of Sept. 30, 2013, was associated with the 2013-14 academic 
year. Therefore, we assigned three-year CDRs for the 2011 fiscal year to the 2013-14 academic year.  
Figure 1 shows the amount of Title IV loans disbursed to institutions with low (0 to 15%), medium (15 
to 30%), and high (30% or greater) three-year CDRs, by sector.2 The top left panel of Figure 1 shows results 
for all sectors combined. In 2007-08, 89% of the $72 billion in total federal loan aid was awarded to low-
CDR institutions (below 15%). By 2012-13, only 75% of the $91 billion in federal loan aid was disbursed to 
low-CDR institutions. In other words, in 2012-13, Title IV institutions with medium or high CDRs (above 
15%) disbursed one in every four student loan dollars. However, in 2013-14 the share of student loans dis-
bursed by institutions with medium or high CDRs decreased moderately as the job-market recovered. 
The top right panel of Figure 1 shows that from 2007-08 through 2013-14 the vast majority of loans to 
the nonprofit four-year sector flowed through colleges with CDRs less than 15%. A different pattern 
emerges for community colleges (middle left panel). The share of federal loans disbursed to community col-
leges with CDRs of 15% or higher increased dramatically during and immediately after the recession (from 
30% in 2007-08 to 86% in 2012-13), but decreased to 77% in 2013-14. By contrast, the share of federal 
loans disbursed to public four-year institutions with CDRs of 15% or higher increased only moderately, 
from 2% in 2007-08 to 9% in 2012-13. 
The bottom left panel shows the for-profit two-year-or-less sector. From 2007-08 to 2009-10 the share 
of federal loans disbursed to institutions with medium and high CDRs increased dramatically. Of the $6.9 
billion in federal loans disbursed to these institutions in 2009-10, 20% was disbursed to low-CDR institu-
tions, 56% was disbursed to medium-CDR institutions, and 24% was disbursed to high-CDR (above 30%) 
institutions. However, in subsequent years the share of federal loans disbursed to high-CDR institutions de-
clined dramatically. 
In the four-year for-profit sector, the share of federal loans disbursed to institutions with CDRs greater 
than 15% increased from 22% in 2007-08 to 69% by 2009-10. This dramatic change was largely due to very 
large for-profits (e.g., University of Phoenix) changing from the 0-15% CDR band to the 15-30% CDR 
band. Note that, in contrast to two-year for-profits, a much smaller share of loans was disbursed to four-
year for-profits with CDRs greater than 30%. By 2012-13, 74% of the $11.5 billion in federal loans was dis-
bursed to institutions with CDRs greater 15%. However, performance of the sector improved somewhat in 
2013-14. 
Figure 2 shows the amount of Title IV grants disbursed to institutions with low, medium, and high three-
year CDRs. In 2007-08, 24% of the $14.7 billion in grant aid was disbursed to institutions with CDRs great-
er than 15%. By 2012-13, over 50% of the $30 billion in grant aid was disbursed to institutions with CDRs 
greater than 15%. However, this trend reversed somewhat by 2013-14.  
Trends over time for specific sectors were similar to the loan aid trends shown in Figure 1. For example, 
at community colleges, the share of grant aid disbursed at institutions with CDRs of 15% or higher in-
creased from 32% in 2007-08 to 77% in 2012-13, but decreased somewhat in 2013-14. In the for-profit two-
year-or-less sector, the share of grant aid disbursed at institutions with CDRs of 15% or higher increased 
from 78% in 2007-08 to 84% in 2009-10, but decreased to 62% by 2013-14. This decrease was driven largely 
by a sharp decline in the share of grants going to institutions with CDR rates of 30% or higher.  
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Figure 1. Distribution of Title IV Loan Aid by 3-year CDR Band and Sectora 
a Total loan amounts are slightly less than total loan amounts from Table 2 because this figure excludes institutions with missing 
three-year CDRs. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of Title IV Grant Aid by 3-year CDR Band and Sectora 
aTotal grant amounts are slightly less than total grant amounts from Table 3 because this figure excludes institutions with missing 
three-year CDRs. 
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To summarize the results for Figures 1 and 2, at private nonprofit and public four-year institutions, insti-
tutions with low CDRs received the vast majority of federal grants and loans disbursed. In the community 
college and for-profit four-year sectors, the share of federal grants and loans disbursed at institutions with 
CDRs greater than 15% increased substantially from 2007-08 to 2012-13, but declined somewhat in 2013-
14. These trends seem to mirror trends in national unemployment rates. In the for-profit two-year-or-less
sector, the share of federal loans disbursed to institutions with medium (15-30%) and high (>30%) CDRs 
reached an apex around 2009-10 but began to decline by 2010-11. This decline predated the job-market re-
covery and was driven primarily by a decline in the share of federal aid being disbursed to institutions with 
CDRs of 30% or higher. Since institutions with CDRs in excess of 30% are subject to sanctions, these 
trends suggest that federal policy may have been a factor in shifting federal financial aid away from poor 
performing institutions in the for-profit two-year-or-less sector. 
Discussion 
As more students rely on federal financial aid to finance their education, policymakers have become inter-
ested in the share of federal aid being disbursed at institutions with high student loan default rates. Recent 
research on student loan default finds that institutional behavior affects default and that attending a for-
profit institution increases the probability of default (e.g., Hillman, 2014b; Sridharam, 2012). Recent supply-
side studies on the allocation of federal financial aid to institutions show that the for-profit sector receives a 
disproportionate share of federal financial aid relative to enrollment (College Board, 2013; Deming, et al., 
2012). Taken together, the findings from these two literatures suggest the idea—raised by federal policy-
makers (e.g., U.S. Department of Education, 2010)—that a significant share of federal aid is being allocated 
to institutions that do not serve students well. However, prior research has not tested this idea because ex-
tant studies analyzed CDRs and federal aid disbursement in isolation from one another.  
The present study contributes to this gap in the literature by analyzing change over time and across sec-
tors in the amount of federal financial aid disbursed at institutions with low, medium, and high CDRs. We 
show that the share of federal student aid flowing through colleges with medium and high CDRs increased 
from 2007-08 to 2012-13. By 2012-13, 50% of federal grant dollars and 25% of federal loan dollars flowed 
to institutions with three-year CDRs greater than 15%. However, these discouraging trends reversed some-
what in 2013-14, when 44% of federal grant dollars and 22% of federal loan dollars were allocated to institu-
tions with three-year CDRs greater than 15%.  
Overall, the prolonged rise and recent decline in the share of aid going to institutions with problematic 
CDRs follow trends in national unemployment rates. Yet trends for for-profits do not seem to mirror na-
tional economic trends. From 2010-11 to 2012-13, total FTE enrollment at for-profits declined by 19% 
while federal grant and loan aid declined by 31% and 37% respectively. These declines in FTE enrollment 
and federal grants and loans were much larger than those experienced by the public and private nonprofit 
sectors. Additionally, prior to recovery in national unemployment rates, there was a dramatic decline in the 
share of federal grants and loans disbursed to two-year-or-less for-profits with CDRs greater than 30%. 
These trends suggest that federal regulatory policies may have contributed to the declining share of federal 
aid to for-profits with high CDRs. 
The results of this study raise important questions for future research. This study does not identify the 
extent to which fluctuations in the economy or revised federal policy rules caused changes over time in the 
flow of federal aid to institutions with problematic CDRs. Future research could shed light on this question 
by identifying which institutions stopped participating in specific federal aid programs over the past decade 
and by analyzing whether these institutions opted out voluntarily or whether they lost eligibility due to viola-
tions of particular Title IV eligibility policies. 
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Implications for Federal Policy 
Evidence from this study can frame future policy debates about CDR rules, with an emphasis on how prin-
cipal agent theory (PAT) should be applied to develop federal policies. Drawing on PAT, the federal gov-
ernment (principal) enters into contracts with postsecondary institutions (agents) to promote policy goals 
related to college access and success. PAT assumes that principals will create incentives that induce agents to 
behave in ways that align with their policy goals. By developing appropriate regulations and monitoring 
agents’ behaviors, agents will perform according to the principal’s interests. Federal CDR policy is one regu-
latory instrument that encourages colleges to lower student loan default rates. Ultimately, if a college does 
not meet the federal performance goals (i.e., if the institution’s CDRs exceed 30% for three years or 40% in 
any given year) then it will lose eligibility for Title IV student aid programs. CDR policy is also a monitoring 
mechanism that helps policymakers assess whether federal student aid dollars are being allocated to institu-
tions with high student loan default rates.  
However, the application of PAT to actual policies can be problematic (Moynihan et al., 2011; Waterman 
& Meier, 1998). One critique of CDR policy is that student characteristics, rather than institutional behavior, 
largely determine CDRs. For example, a college can have a low CDR by simply enrolling students who have 
the financial capacity to repay their loans (e.g., have high family income, employment networks, etc.). Cur-
rent CDR policy rewards these colleges with more favorable grant and loan conditions, not necessarily be-
cause of their efforts to reduce default but due to the students they admit (Gross, et al., 2009; Hillman, 
2013). Is this truly a measure of institutional performance? We suspect not. Furthermore, our analyses sug-
gest that CDRs are sensitive to economic conditions, which institutions cannot control. 
Nevertheless, we maintain that a strong argument exists for holding Title IV institutions accountable for 
student loan default rates. First, research shows that institutional behaviors do affect the probability of stu-
dent loan default (Belfield, 2013; Hillman, 2014b). Therefore, holding institutions accountable for student 
success provides institutions with an incentive to engage in behaviors that lower the probability of default. 
Second, regardless of the reasons for default, allowing colleges with high CDRs to participate in the federal 
financial aid system does not serve federal policy goals or the interests of students. 
However, the federal government could consider alternative strategies to induce colleges to behave in 
line with federal policy goals. First, the current thresholds for Title IV sanctions (i.e., having three-year 
CDRs in excess 40% for one year or 30% for three consecutive years) may not provide a strong enough in-
centive for colleges to actually reduce student default rates. For example, current policy treats a college with 
a CDR of 16% the same as a college with a CDR of 29%. Our findings show that federal funds were in-
creasingly flowing through institutions with CDRs above 15% but below 30%. Having more gradient 
thresholds for benefits and sanctions (i.e., 15% to 20%, 25% to 25%, etc.) could help federal policymakers 
monitor colleges more closely and offer incentives for moving to the next-lowest CDR band. We 
acknowledge that the creation of finer CDR thresholds could have unintended consequences and could cre-
ate additional gaming of the system. Nevertheless, our point is that more gradient thresholds for CDR bene-
fits and sanctions may help regulators hold a larger proportion of institutions accountable for their 
performance.  
Second, when considering new CDR thresholds, it is also important to consider weighting CDRs accord-
ing to the percentage of students who borrow at a given institution. For example, in the fall of 2013, the 
federal government reported that San Bernardino Valley College had a three-year CDR of 27%, which was 
close to the CDR threshold associated with Title IV sanctions. However, the CDR denominator contained 
only 193 students who entered repayment and the numerator included only 52 defaulters. By comparison, in 
2012-13, the college disbursed $18.5 million in Pell Grants to 5,839 recipients. It seems draconian to threat-
en that access to Pell Grants for thousands of low-income students because of the outcome of 52 borrowers. 
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Current CDR policy offers little nuance or precision for identifying and sanctioning truly poor performing 
institutions, since they do not account for the proportion of students who borrow.  
 
Furthermore, the example of San Bernardino Valley College suggests that current CDR policy may create 
an incentive for community colleges that rely heavily on Pell Grant funding to opt out of the Direct Loan 
program to avoid Title IV sanctions. Therefore, future research should examine whether community colleg-
es opt out of Federal Direct Loan programs because they are concerned that Title IV sanctions from high 
CDRs would threaten their Pell Grant funding. 
 
Implications for Institutional Practitioners 
 
While federal policymakers set broad regulatory and monitoring parameters, aid administrators are the ones 
implementing federal policy. We offer two recommendations for aid administrators. First, in order to avoid 
the penalties associated with CDR policy, financial aid offices should have someone on staff (likely the di-
rector) with a strong understanding of federal CDR policy rules. The Cohort Default Rate Guide, published by 
the Office of Federal Student Aid (2014a), describes how CDRs are calculated, what loan programs are in-
cluded in the calculation of CDRs, what sanctions are associated with different CDR levels, and how to ap-
peal potential sanctions.  
 
For example, for colleges that have a large number of Pell recipients and a small number of federal loan 
borrowers (like the San Bernardino Valley College example), it is possible for campus officials to make a 
“participation rate index appeal” to the U.S. Department of Education (Federal Student Aid, 2014a). A suc-
cessful appeal allows colleges to recalculate their CDR with an alternative measure, specified by the De-
partment, which accounts for the proportion of students who borrow. This appeal is built into the system to 
help colleges with few borrowers to avoid Title IV sanctions.  
 
Of course, the surest way to avoid CDR sanctions is to help students finance college without loans and 
to implement default management plans that reduce the number of students who default on federal loans. 
Although a review of such practices is beyond the scope of this paper, many articles—including several pre-
viously published in this journal—analyze and discuss the implementation best practices (e.g., financial liter-
acy programs) designed to reduce student loan default (e.g., Andruska, Hogarth, Fletcher, Forbes, & 
Wohlgemuth, 2014; Herr & Burt, 2005; Kesterman, 2005; Loonin, 2012). 
 
Second, as we move closer to reauthorization of the Higher Education Act, institutional practitioners 
should become versed in current debates about Title IV regulatory policy3 and seek opportunities to con-
tribute productively to these debates. Recent policy debates have focused on the proposed gainful employ-
ment rule and the creation of a postsecondary institution rating system (PIRS). The federal government 
recently released a “final” version of the gainful employment rule (Field, 2014a) and an updated plan for the 
rating system (Field, 2014c). However, prospects for the passage of these proposals have dimmed since the 
2014 midterm elections when Republicans took control of Congress and the Senate Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP). The Republican-led HELP Committee has initiated policy efforts 
to simplify federal financial aid applications for students and to reduce Title IV regulations for institutions 
(Stratford, 2014).  
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Nexus: Connecting Research to Practice 
 Financial aid administrators should familiarize themselves with CDR rules and know how 
to make Participation Rate Index appeals. 
 Institutions should be proactive about developing and implementing effective default 
management plans. 
 Institutional practitioners should remain abreast of current debates about Title IV  
legislation and regulations, and should seek opportunities to contribute to these debates. 
 When establishing new CDR thresholds, federal policymakers and officials should  
consider weighting CDRs according to the percentage of students who borrow at a  
given institution. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 Note that trial three-year CDRs were calculated for the 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 fiscal years, and official 
three-year CDRs were calculated for the 2009, 2010, and 2011 fiscal years. 
2 Results for the private non-profit two-year-or-less sector are omitted, but are available upon request. 
3 The NASFAA website provides information designed to introduce practitioners to policy proposals devel-
oped for the reauthorization of the Higher Education Act at http://www.nasfaa.org/reauth/  
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Appendix. Number of Students Entering Loan Repayment and Defaulting within Three Yearsa 
 
  
  
Number of students entering repayment 
CDR fiscal year Four-year institutions Two-year-or-less institutions Total 
 
Enter  
repayment 
Default  
window 
Public 
Non-
profit 
For-
profit 
Public 
Non-
profit 
For-
profit  
2005 
10/1/04 to 
9/30/05 
10/1/04 to 
9/30/07 
 1,310,408  896,180  307,450  474,841  27,105   377,967  3,393,951 
2006 
10/1/05 to 
9/30/06 
10/1/05 to 
9/30/08 
 1,429,425  995,989  412,562  542,051  29,331   397,420  3,806,778 
2007 
10/1/06 to 
9/30/07 
10/1/06 to 
9/30/09 
 1,206,203  730,163  412,698  504,899  23,970   393,856  3,271,789 
2008 
10/1/07 to 
9/30/08 
10/1/07 to 
9/30/10 
 1,212,098  713,818  451,732  501,763  19,542   402,568  3,301,521 
2009 
10/1/08 to 
9/30/09 
10/1/08 to 
9/30/11 
 1,234,738  781,164  544,581  549,062  20,274   396,410  3,526,229 
2010 
10/1/09 to 
9/30/10 
10/1/09 to 
9/30/12 
 1,305,170  813,704  748,095  636,577  21,939   510,029  4,035,514 
2011 
10/1/10 to 
9/30/11 
10/1/10 to 
9/30/13 
 1,467,542  897,932  904,957  824,671  22,881   574,252  4,692,235 
   Number of defaults within three years 
CDR fiscal year Four-year institutions Two-year-or-less institutions Total 
 
Enter  
repayment 
Default  
window Public 
Non-
profit 
For-
profit Public 
Non-
profit 
For-
profit  
2005 
10/1/04 to 
9/30/05 
10/1/04 to 
9/30/07 
63,385 34,480 43,135 63,369 3,772 74,855  282,996 
2006 
10/1/05 to 
9/30/06 
10/1/05 to 
9/30/08 
76,541 40,757 63,312 75,564 4,306 88,464  348,944 
2007 
10/1/06 to 
9/30/07 
10/1/06 to 
9/30/09 
84,920 43,662 74,623 81,625 3,997 95,950  384,777 
2008 
10/1/07 to 
9/30/08 
10/1/07 to 
9/30/10 
84,899 44,138 91,311 81,350 2,935 99,584  404,217 
2009 
10/1/08 to 
9/30/09 
10/1/08 to 
9/30/11 
96,375 52,723 122,149 100,668 3,080 87,126  462,121 
2010 
10/1/09 to 
9/30/10 
10/1/09 to 
9/30/12 
120,772 60,456 167,728 132,500 3,280 104,392  589,128 
2011 
10/1/10 to 
9/30/11 
10/1/10 to 
9/30/13 
129,711 59,011 169,063 167,609 3,177 109,128  637,699 
 
a “Trial” three-year CDRs were calculated for the 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 fiscal years and “official” three-year CDRs were 
calculated for the 2009, 2010, and 2011 fiscal years. 
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